Network resilience — in practice

What this is about

What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out.

The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. A rule that never fires is more dangerous than no rule — it manufactures a false sense of safety. When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect.

• What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin.
• A rule that never fires is more dangerous than no rule — it manufactures a false sense of safety.
• The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out.

What happens in practice

What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin.

When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through. When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through.

What we recommend

A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. A rule that never fires is more dangerous than no rule — it manufactures a false sense of safety. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through.

Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect.

Common mistakes

The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect.

Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected.

Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. A rule that never fires is more dangerous than no rule — it manufactures a false sense of safety. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable.

In summary

The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect.

What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. Filtering only at the origin means you have already paid for the capacity you meant to protect. Before any rule change, it should be clear what share of real traffic would be affected. A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable.

A layer 7 attack often looks harmless on the network graph because bandwidth stays unremarkable. What matters is not the packet rate but how expensive a single request is for the origin. The threshold that was right yesterday is wrong again after a marketing campaign goes out. A rule that never fires is more dangerous than no rule — it manufactures a false sense of safety. When in doubt: observe before blocking — a false positive costs more than a scan that got through.